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NOTES
Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the
Public Have a Right to Know?
When officials at the Xerox plant near Webster, New York
discovered that a hazardous chemical had leaked into the ground-
water and contaminated a private well, they disclosed the leak to
the community and assured local residents that there were no
long-term health risks. However, two families later sued Xerox on
allegations that air and water discharges from the plant had
caused members of both families to suffer health problems, in-
cluding a rare form of cancer in one teenage girl. The parties
reached a settlement in 1988. Pursuant to the agreement, Xerox
paid the families approximately $4.75 million and relocated them,
but admitted no liability. Under the terms of the settlement, the
trial judge sealed all the court records and prohibited the parties
and their attorneys, on penalty of contempt, from discussing the
matter with the media or the general public. The secrecy sur-
rounding the settlement has distressed other local residents who
are uncertain about what the real health risks are. They are thus
unable to make informed decisions about the precautions they
should take on their own behalf. The confidentiality order has
also frustrated the efforts of health officials as they 'attempt to
determine the long-term consequences of exposure to toxic chemi-
cals.'
The sealing of court records and the enforcement of cove-
nants of silence are becoming increasingly common practices in
the settlement of civil lawsuits. Defendants typically request confi-
dentiality to avoid disclosure of sensitive or potentially damaging
information, while plaintiffs' attorneys may agree to confidentiality
in an effort to obtain larger settlements for their clients.2 Al-
though the terms of a settlement have traditionally been consid-
1 Weiser, Forging a 'Covenant of Silence, The Washington Post, March 13, 1989, at
Al, col. 1. As Weiser notes, with the exception of lead and asbestos, little is known
about the health consequences of many toxic chemicals. Scientific and medical knowl-
edge about the long-term effects of low-level toxic exposure is still evolving. Id. at A8,
col. 1.
2 Id.
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ered a private matter between the parties,S different concerns
surface when a judge participates in the secrecy by sealing the file
and ordering the parties not to discuss the case except among
themselves. Prior to 1983, few cases directly addressed the issue
of sealing settlement agreements along with the rest of the case
file. As one judge has commented, "many trial judges regard it as
self-evident that secrecy is often necessary and they therefore
order settlement agreements filed under seal as a matter of
course."4 Through media and other public interest group inter-
vention, appellate courts are just beginning to scrutinize sealing
orders more closely.
American courts have long recognized that decisions concern-
ing access to court records are committed to the discretion of the
trial judge.5 The specific exemption of courts from the public
disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act rein-
forces this common law principle.6 However, acknowledging the
trial court's discretion on access matters does not mean that the
discretion is unfettered. Rather, it is constrained by legal rules
and standards.
This Note will explore the rules and standards that govern a
judge's decision to permanently seal the court records of a settled
case and to order the parties to remain silent about the case. Part
I will examine the public's right of access to court records under
both the common law and the first amendment. Part II will then
evaluate ways of protecting the public interest. Part III will ana-
lyze the constitutionality of court orders enforcing the litigants'
stipulation to not discuss the case with third parties. Finally, Part
IV will propose some ethical considerations for the parties and
their counsel to discuss before consenting to a covenant of si-
lence.
For purposes of this Note, the term "court records" will refer
to all documents filed with the court, such as pleadings, motions,
3 In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Utig., 92 F.R.D. 468, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff d
nom. FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).
4 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d
339, 351 (3d Cir. 1986) (Garth, J., dissenting). In suppori of this conclusion, Judge
Garth noted the frequent references to "sealings made without comment or challenge in
reported cases." Id. (citing as examples Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Kilbane, 739 F.2d
958, 959 (4th Cir. 1984); Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461, 1462 (9th Cir. 1983);
EEOC v. Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Martin & Unis, 626 F.2d 1272, 1274 (5th Cir.
1980)).
5 Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978); Hotel
Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 344.
6 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(IXB) (1988).
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supporting affidavits, and orders. The term also includes settle-
ment agreements filed with the court. Although the parties may
not be required by statute to file such agreements with the court,
the parties will frequently opt to do so in order to obtain a con-
sent decree that will enable them to enforce the agreement by
use of the court's contempt power without filing an entirely new
lawsuit." In addition, court records encompass judicial opinions
and evidentiary materials used at trial. This Note, however, will
not focus on these aspects of court records because they have
been addressed in other writings.8
I. SEALING COURT RECORDS
Entities seeking to challenge sealing orders most frequently
assert a public right of access to court records under both the
common law and the first amendment. Challengers occasionally
argue access under the Freedom of Information Act,9 but courts
have uniformly rejected this argument."0 In addition, several
7 See generally Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MIcH. L.
REV. 321, 324-31 (1988) (discussing the nature of consent decrees-why parties want
them and why courts agree to enforce them); Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 43.
8 See Note, The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In Camera or
On Camera, 16 GA. L REV. 659 (1982) [hereinafter Note, The Common Law' Right] (dis-
cussing access to audio and video tapes introduced into evidence); Note, Sealed Judicial
Records and Infant Doe: A Proposal to Protect the Public's Right of Access, 16 IND. L REv.
861 (1983).
9 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
10 Courts have held that the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to court
orders; in fact, courts are specifically excluded from the Act's disdosure requirements
under 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (1988). Therefore, a court does not have to limit a sealing
order to documents exempted from the Act. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); FDIC v.
Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982) ("FOIA does not apply to a court's or-
der directing an agency not to reveal the terms of an agreement crucial to the settle-
ment of an action."), aJJ'g In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 92 F.R.D. 468 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
This line of cases is distinguishable from those cases holding that settlement docu-
ments which involve public agencies and officials, but are not filed with the court, are
public records to which the public has a right of access under the various state freedom
of information/public records laws. See, e.g., Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc.
v. County of Orange, 158 Cal. App. 3d 893, 901, 205 Cal. Rptr. 92, 96-97 (1984) (settle-
ment documents in negligence claim by county inmate against sheriff); Dutton v. Guste,
395 So.2d 683, 684-85 (La. 1981) (settlement documents in action by state against archi -
tects and engineers for defective design and construction of Superdome, a public build-
ing); News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., 55 N.C. App. 1, 12-
13, 284 S.E.2d 542, 549 (1981) (settlement documents in actions against county hospital),
petition denied, 305 N.C. 302, 292 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 459 U.S.
1990]
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states have created a statutory right of access to judicial re-
cords." These statutory rights, though, are generally treated as
codifications of the common law right and do not offer protec-
tion beyond the common law. 2
The common law and first amendment arguments are very
similar, although the common law right is generally recognized
while the first amendment right is not." Both are rooted in his-
tory and invoke strong policy considerations. Theoretically, a first
amendment right of access would afford the public interest great-
er protection than the common law right. To override a first
amendment right there must be a compelling governmental inter-
est and a narrowly tailored order, whereas the common law right
at most receives a strong presumption of access. 14 In practice,
however, courts often confuse the two rights. In some jurisdic-
tions, the first amendment right is limited by common law excep-
tions, 5 and sometimes the common law right receives strict scru-
tiny/compelling interest protection. 6 This lack of clarity about
the nature of the public's right of access and the standards to be
applied has produced widely varied outcomes in sealing order
disputes.
A. The Common Law Approach
Both English and American common law have long recog-
nized the public's right to inspect and copy judicial records, often
referred to as a "right of access." 7 Under the English system all
803 (1982); Daily Gazette Co. v. Withrow, 350 S.E.2d 738, 743-44 (W.Va. 1986)
(settlement documents in civil rights action against county sheriff); see also Society of
Professional Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 & n.4 (D. Utah 1987) (citing
the above and other cases).
11 See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 251(A) (West Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2-203 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 17-43 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.35(1)(a) (West 1986).
12 See Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 258, 368 S.E.2d
253, 255 (1988) (construing § 17-43 of the Virginia Code along common law principles);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 19.35(1)(a) (West 1986) ("Substantive common law principles constru-
ing the right to inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall remain in effect.").
13 Compare infra note 17 with infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
14 Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); An-
derson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986); Mokhiber
v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1108 (D.C. 1988).
15 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
16 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987);
Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (lth Cir. 1985).
17 For a discussion of the history of the public's right of access under both the
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persons enjoy the common law right of access, but only those
with a proprietary or evidentiary interest in the documents can
enforce the right if access is wrongfully denied."8 American com-
mon law does not so restrict the public's right; 9 nevertheless,
American courts have uniformly held that the public's right of
access is not absolute, and that a court has discretion to limit
access to court records in some situations." The exact scope of
the public's right is not clear, and the courts have widely varying
views on the matter. Specifically, three issues are involved: (1) the
documents to which the public's right of access attaches; (2) the
strength of the common law right in relation to competing inter-
ests favoring limited access; and (3) the scope of the public's right
of access once a court has entered a sealing order.
1. The Documents to Which the Public's Right of Access
Attaches
One way that courts have tried to limit the public's right of
access is by defining categories of documents to which the public
right attaches. Generally, the line of distinction centers around
the role that a document plays in the adjudication process. Some
courts have held that the common law right extends only to those
materials upon which the court relies in determining the substan-
tive rights of the parties.21 This limitation is based on the as-
sumption that the primary purpose of the public's right of access
to court records is to check the exercise of judicial authority, and
not to provide information about the dispute being resolved.2
English and American .common law, see Note, The Common Law Right, supra note 8, at
660-72.
18 Id. at 666.
19 Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Ex parte
Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435, 440 (1915).
20 See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); In re
Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc. 723 F.2d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1983); Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983), cet. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984); Crystal Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980);
Vassiliades v. Israely, 714 F. Supp. 604, 605 (D. Conn. 1989); State v. Cottman Transmis-
sion Sys., Inc., 75 Md. App. 647, 656, 542 A.2d 859, 863 (1988); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Minn. 1986).
21 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Fin. Managemefit Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987);
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986); In re Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Simon v. G. D. Searle & Co., 119
F.R.D. 683, 684 (D. Minn. 1987).
22 Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C. 1988) ("right of access is ground-
ed primarily in the need for scrutiny of the legal process, not simply in the public's
desire to learn more about the deeds and misdeeds of the parties.").
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This limitation upon the public right of access significantly
affects access to the records of cases settled out of court because
settled cases never reach full determination, by the court, of the
parties' substantive rights. Several courts confronting this problem
have tried to resolve it by expanding the categories of documents
to which the common law right of access attaches to include pro-
cedural motions and supporting documents, motions never ruled
on, and settlement agreements enforced by consent decree. In
Mokhiber v. Davis,2" the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia held that the common law right applied to procedural
motions, such as motions to compel discovery and motions to
amend the pleadings, evidence submitted with such motions, and
the court's dispositions of those motions.24 The court said that
"[b]y submitting pleadings and motions to the court for decision,
one enters the public arena of courtroom proceedings and expos-
es oneself, as well as the opposing party, to the risk, though by
no means the certainty, of public scrutiny."25 The court reasoned
that although the pretrial materials "may tell the public little
about what actually happened to the parties and who ought to
win, . . . they may reveal a great deal about the character of the
judicial process."26 Pretrial rulings in modern litigation, the court
said, "generally 'play a significant role in the administration of
justice.
Mokhiber also involved a question of access to two pretrial
motions that the trial court had never ruled on because the case
was settled. The court of appeals held that the presumptive right
of access also applied to these materials-the right having at-
tached when the documents were submitted to the court for de-
cision.2' The court reasoned that motions may affect how the
trial court perceives a case and manages it toward settlement. The
trial court may defer ruling on certain motions in order to devel-
op opportunities for settlement. The information contained in the
motions may also influence the trial court's decision to ratify the
23 537. A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1988).
24 Id. at 1111-13; accord Atlanta Journal v. Long, 258 Ga. 410, 369 S.E.2d 755
(1988).
25 537 A.2d at 1111.
26 Id. at 1113.
27 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1986)).
28 Mohhiber, 537 A.2d 1100, 1112-13 (D.C. 1988); accord In re Continental Ill. Sec.
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1309-10 (7th Cir. 1984) ("withdrawal of motion is immaterial to
whether presumption of access applies").
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settlement in a consent decree. 29
The First Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Federal Trade
Commission v. Standard Financial Management Corp."0 That case in-
volved access to financial statements contained in the administra-
tive record of a case settled by consent decree. The defendants
tried to argue that the trial judge did not rely on the financial
statements in approving the settlement and thus the public right
of access did not attach to the particular documents. Although
the trial judge admitted in retrospect that the documents were
material and important to his decision to approve the settle-
ment,"1 the First Circuit held that any "relevant documents
which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent ju-
risdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceedings, become docu-
ments to which the presumption of public access applies." 2 The
court said that when a public agency requests judicial approval of
a negotiated consent decree, the court must determine whether
the agreement is equitable, adequate, and reasonable. Because the
agency presumably relied upon the totality of the administrative
record in deciding to agree to the settlement, the record was
clearly relevant to the court's determination. Thus, once the re-
cord was submitted to the judge, it could be assumed to have
played a role in the judge's deliberations."3
The Third Circuit, in Bank of America National Trust & Sav-
ings Association v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates, 4 explicitly held that
the common law right of access to court records applied to settle-
ment agreements filed with the court and embodied in a consent
decree. Significant to the court's holding was the fact that the
parties had voluntarily filed the settlement agreement with the
court in order to obtain a consent decree that would allow them
to enforce their agreement by use of the court's contempt pow-
er. 5 The court said:
Having undertaken to utilize the judicial process to interpret
29 Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1113.
30 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987).
31 Id. at 409 n.5.
32 Id. at 409.
33 Id. at 408-09.
34 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986).
35 The common law right of access also attaches to settlement documents which are
required to be filed with the court, although other factors may, nonetheless, allow the
court to seal the documents. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 322
N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986). See generally Fohan, Sealing and Unsealing Wrongiul Death and
Minor Settlement Documents, 13 WM. MITCHELL L REV. 505 (1987).
1990]
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the settlement and to enforce it, the parties are, no longer
entitled to invoke the confidentiality ordinarily accorded settle-
ment agreements. Once a settlement is filed in the district
court, it becomes a judicial record, and subject to the access
accorded such records.'
The court suggested that if the parties had wanted to prevent
public access to their settlement agreement, they could have filed
a voluntary stipulation of dismissal.3 7
Although these expansions of the reliance rule eliminate the
difficulty of trying to divine the thought processes of the trial
judge" and allow the public to inspect the court records of set-
tled cases, this ad hoc approach to defining the scope of the com-
mon law right belies the spirit of the right.3 9 The philosophical
reasoning behind the common law right of access is not only to
allow the public to oversee and thus acquire an understanding of
the judicial process, but also to promote confidence in and re-
spect for the system. A system that limits access to court docu-
ments not on the basis of the information they contain, but on
the basis of the label they bear, is not conducive to the goals of
confidence, understanding, and respect. It projects an image of
secrecy and distorted truth around what should be an open judi-
cial system. A better rule would recognize a general right of ac-
cess to all documents filed with the court limited by exceptions
pertaining to subject matter.4" In fact, the state legislatures that
have codified the common law right to inspect judicial records
have not limited its application to certain categories of docu-
ments, but rather have, said that all judicial records shall be open
for inspection, except as otherwise provided by statute.41 Because
trial courts may now order that discovery materials not be filed
with the court,"2 and because the parties may file a voluntary
stipulation of dismissal instead of the actual settlement agreement,
the interests in protecting these traditionally. private documents
36 Hotel Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 345.
37 Id at 344; accord H. S. Gere & Sons, Inc. v. Frey, 400 Mass. 326, 332 n.16, 509
N.E.2d 271, 275 n.16 (1987).
38 FTG v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987).
39 See Morrison, Protective Order, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and the Public Interest in Disclo-
sure: Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L REv. 109, 119 (1989) (criticizing this ap-
proach as creating artificial boundaries to avoid addressing the substantive competing in-
terests).
40 See infra section II.C., A Proposal.
41 See supra note 11.
42 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 n.19 (1984).
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would not be compromised." It would be better for trial courts
to exercise some of their discretion over their records before
documents actually become public records than to apply ad hoc
rules to limit access retrospectively.
2. The Strength of the Common Law Right of Access in
Relation to Competing Considerations
Having determined that the common law right of access ap-
plies to court records that the parties have requested to be
sealed, a court must then decide what weight to give the public's
right when balancing it against competing interests favoring non-
disclosure. Most appellate courts agree that the parties' desire or
agreement to seal the court records does not justify automatic
sealing by the court." The court must make its own determina-
tion, and the parties bear the burden of showing independent
reasons for restricting access.45 Trade secrets, potentially defama-
tory material, and national security issues are generally recognized
exceptions to the common law right,4 but beyond these there
are no uniformly applicable principles.
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,47 the Supreme
Court acknowledged the existence of a common law right to in-
spect and copy judicial records. But, since the court based its
decision on a federal statute rather than on the common law, it
did not elaborate upon the scope of the common law right.4"
43 See generally Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L
REV. 1 (1983).
44 Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (1lth Cir. 1985) ("litigants do
not have the right to agree to seal what were public records"); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984) ("confidentiality agreement between the parties does not bind the court in any
way"); Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 149 Cal. App. 3d 308, 318 n.4, 196 Cal. Rptr. 871,
877 n.4 (1983) ("It is doubtful that a trial court could find good cause to seal all court
records solely because one party paid money to the other or because the parties stipu-
lated"); H. S. Gere & Sons, Inc. v. Frey, 400 Mass. 326, 329, 509 N.E.2d 271, 273
(1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Minn.
1986); Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 259, 368 S.E.2d 253,
256 (1988). But see Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073-74 (3d Cir.
1984) (suggesting in dicta that a binding contractual obligation between the parties not
to disclose certain information would override the presumption of access because "disclo-
sure would deprive the litigant of his right to enforce a legal obligation").
45 Eg., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800
F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986).
46 Fg., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); Brown &
Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
47 435 U.S. .589 (1978).
48 Id. at 603. In Warner Communications, several members of the news media re-
1990]
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The Court merely said that the common law right was entitled to
a "presumption-however gauged."49 This dicta has given state
and lower federal courts ample leeway to develop their own vary-
ing formulations for balancing the competing interests. Some
courts hold that the presumption is merely one factor included
among other interests favoring disclosure." Others characterize
it as a strong presumption of openness which can only be overrid-
den by strong countervailing reasons.51 Still others would raise
the common law right to near constitutional status by requiring a
compelling interest and a narrowly tailored order.5 2
Another approach is to scale the weight of the presumption
of access in proportion to the public's interest in the controversy.
For example, in H. S. Gere & Sons, Inc. v. Frey,"3 the Massachu-
setts court held that only a showing of good cause or a legitimate
expectation of privacy was needed to seal the records of a case
involving private individuals, whereas if a public figure was in-
volved, the parties would be required to demonstrate an overrid-
ing necessity for sealing.54 This approach embodies a philosophy
that civil litigation is primarily for the litigants and that privacy in-
terests should generally outweigh the public interest in access.
This, however, is not the case.
The American legal system offers many methods of resolving
disputes, one of which is to bring the dispute into the public
forum of the court. Once the parties choose to bring their dis-
pute before the court, their privacy interests fade.5 "While the
quested access to audiotapes introduced into evidence during the prosecutions of four
Watergate defendants. The Court denied the press physical access to the tapes on the
ground that the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act specified an
alternate procedure for the release of the Watergate tapes. Id.
49 Id. at 602.
50 See, e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983); Crystal Grower's
Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1980); Atlanta Journal v. Long, 258 Ga. 410,
369 S.E.2d 755 (1988); C.L v. Edson, 140 Wis. 2d 168, 409 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App.
1987).
51 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir.
1987) (presumption is not overpowering but only the most compelling reasons justify
sealing); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986).
52 See, e.g., Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985);
Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 258, 368 S.E.2d 253, 256
(1988) (the moving party must establish an interest so compelling that it cannot be
reasonably protected by alternate measures).
53 400 Mass. 326, 509 N.E.2d 271 (1987).
54 Id. at 329-32, 509 N.E.2d at 273-75; see also FTC v. Standard Fin. Management
Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 412 (1st Cir. 1987) (threshold for sealing is elevated because the
case involves a government agency and matters of public concern).
55 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975); accord C. L. v.
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judicial process should not be used solely to expose previously
private matters, the significance of events that become entangled
with the judicial system, and the system's response, can become
indistinguishable from the significance of the system itself."5"
The public thus has an interest in knowing and understanding the
kinds of disputes that are presented for resolution in the public
forum.5 The, public also has an interest in assuring that courts
are fairly run and that judges are honest.5" In addition, whether
or not the right of access to judicial records is a directly enforce-
able constitutional right,59 it undeniably has constitutional under-
pinnings." Public access to court records is important for in-
formed discussion of governmental affairs. It promotes respect for
and understanding of the legal system. Thus, the common law
right to inspect judicial records is deserving of a strong presump-
tion independent of the public's interest in the subject matter of
the controversy before the court, though this may be an addition-
al factor weighing in favor of disclosure.6
A strong presumption of access does not mean that all priva-
cy interests pale by comparison. Rather, the parties seeking to re-
strict access must make a particularized showing of harm that will
result if the information contained in court records is revealed.62
General assertions that the case is a private dispute between pri-
Edson, 409 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) ("private party gives up a certain
expectation of privacy when it commences a civil suit").
56 Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1117 (D.C. 1988).
57 In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th Cir. 1984); Crystal
Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Morrison, supra
note 39, at 118 ("Litigation is not just for the litigants, at least not in our system. In
our system, we are concerned with overall justice. We are concerned about the next
case. We are concerned about public controversies that arise in public forums and are
decided there.").
58 In re Continental, '732 F.2d at 1314; Dobbins, 616 F.2d at 461.
59 See infra notes 88-140 and accompanying text.
60. See O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know", 7 HASTINGS
CONST. LQ. 579 (1980).
61 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 US. 1100 (1984) (parties' desire to shield prejudicial information
from public records "cannot be accommodated without seriously undermining the tradi-
tion of an open judicial system"); C. L v. Edson, 409 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (strong presumption in favor of disclosure reflects interests independent of the
parties status as private individuals).
62 Eg, Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800
F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1986); FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404,
412 (1st Cir. 1987); see also, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d
197 (Minn. 1986) (litigants produced evidence of harassment and physical intrusion into
their lives as a result of litigation concerning airline crash).
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vate parties or that disclosure will embarrass or damage the repu-
tation of the parties are not sufficient." As one court observed,
"[i]njury to corporate or personal reputation is an inherent risk in
almost every civil suit."6
In requests to seal the judicial records of settled cases, the
public policy of encouraging dispute settlement without litigation
is also pitted against the strong presumption of public access to
court records. Settlement is favored because it not only saves the
parties the time, delay, expense, and publicity of an open trial,
but also serves the public interest by conserving judicial resources
and clearing court dockets, thus promoting a more effective and
efficient judicial system. It is argued that a policy allowing access
to the records of settled cases will discourage future settlements
and may even dissuade prospective litigants from bringing their
disputes before the court at all. The problem becomes more acute
when the parties condition their settlement on obtaining a court
order sealing the record. This places the trial judge in the awk-
ward position of having either to honor the parties' request to
the detriment of the public right of access, or to force the parties
to go to trial to the detriment of the public policy favoring settle-
ment.
By way of example, In re Franklin National Bank Securities.
Litigation,65 was a complex multi-district case arising out of the
failure of Franklin National Bank. After five years of preparation,
the case went to trial. On the first day of what promised to be at
least a six-month trial, the parties reached a settlement. The par-
ties would not have settled without an agreement to keep the
terms of the settlement confidential because one of the parties
was concerned that disclosure might affect unrelated legal dis-
putes.66 The trial court consequently sealed all the settlement
documents and upheld the order against a public interest group's
subsequent challenge. The court reasoned that a six-month trial
would have required enormous expenditures of both litigant and
63 E.g., In re Analytical Systems, Inc., 83 Bankr. 833, 836 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987);
Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1985); Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984); Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 259, 368
S.E.2d 253, 256 (1988).
64 State v. Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc., 75 Md. App. 647, 658, 542 A.2d 859,
864 (1988).
65 92 F.R.D. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), ajrd sub nom. FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 697 F.2d
230 (2d Cir. 1982).
66 92 F.RD. at 469-70.
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jiudicial resources. The court was concerned that litigation expens-
es might have consumed the remainder of the defendants' insur-
ance coverage leaving little or nothing to satisfy a judgment. In
order to avert these consequences, the court ruled that sealing
was justified."
Other courts, though, have found that the public interest in
encouraging settlement does not override the strong presumption
favoring access. In one case," a Wisconsin court held that the
chilling effect on future litigation and settlement was mere specu-
lation. 9 In Wilson v. American Motors Corp.,"° the Eleventh Cir-
cuit acknowledged that courts should encourage settlements. Nev-
ertheless, the court said that monetary settlement between the
parties was not even entitled to consideration in deciding whether
to seal the record." The court also held that the parties' desire
to prevent the use of the trial record in other litigation was not
an adequate justification because judicial economy would mandate
that court records which are relevant to issues in other proceed-
ings be made available. 2
Unquestionably the interest in encouraging settlements is
important. The fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude
settlements and offers of settlement from the realm of admissible
evidence is indicative of this strong public policy.7' However, de-
cisions which hold that the public interest in encouraging settle-
ment is stronger than the public interest in access set dangerous
precedent. In a system in which approximately ninety percent of
all cases are settled without trial, 4 such rulings pave the way for
a largely secretive judicial system.
67 Id. at 472. A few state courts have reached similar conclusions, although these
cases have had other justifications for sealing, in addition to the public policy favoring
settlement. See Crain Communications, Inc. v. Hughes, 135 A.D.2d 351, 521 N.Y.S.2d
244 (1987), appeal dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 993, 524 N.E.2d 878,529 N.Y.S.2d 277, appeal
granted, 73 N.Y.2d 701, 533 N.E.2d 673, 536 N.Y.S.2d 743, affid, 74 N.Y.2d 626, 539
N.E.2d 1099, 541 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1988) (trade secrets); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986) (evidence of harassment and physical intru-
sion).
68 C.L v. Edson, 140 Wis. 2d 168, 409 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1987).
69 409 N.W.2d at 423; accord Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235
Va. 253, 260 n.2, 368 S.E.2d 253, 256 n.2 (1988):
70 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985).
71 Id. at 1571 n.4.
72 Id. at 1571 & n.3.
73 See FED. R. EvID. 408.
74 Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L REV. 4,
28 (1983).
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Giving preference to the public interest in access should not
seriously hinder efforts to settle. The incentives for settling, such
as saving time and expense and avoiding the publicity of a trial,
are still valid whether or not the parties are allowed to seal the
case files. Litigants who want to protect the confidentiality of
their settlement have the option of filing a voluntary stipulation
of dismissal, 5 but they should not be entitled to seal court re-
cords simply because they succeeded in reaching a settlement
agreement. The public policy favoring settlements is not so strong
that sealing court records should be a reward for settling early.
3. The Public Right of Access Once Records Have Been Sealed
The balance of interests shifts slightly once a court has made
the decision to seal records and the time for appealing the order
has expired. The presumption favoring the correctness of a trial
court's actions becomes operative.76 In addition, the parties' reli-
ance on the court order of confidentiality and the importance of
preserving the judgment's stability must be considered. Because of
the public right to inspect judicial records, a third party always
has standing to subsequently challenge an existing sealing order
and is usually permitted to intervene in order to do so.77 How-
ever, the burden of producing evidence and persuading ,the court
to vacate or modify the order then falls upon the intervenor. The
parties who originally requested the sealing order have
presumedly already satisfied their burden of proof.7
A party seeking to vacate an existing sealing order may al-
ways attack the order on the ground that the court improperly
granted the order in the first place.79 As the Second Circuit stat-
ed in Palmieri v. New York,"0 "no amount of... reliance could
substantiate an unquestioning adherence to an order improvident-
ly granted."8 ' The intervening party, however, must show that
75 See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800
F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986).
76 Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1116 n.15 (D.C. 1988).
77 Id. at 1113, 1117. See also Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir.
1985); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Utig., 92 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd sub
nom. FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).
78 But see Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 149 Cal. App. 3d 308, 318, 196 Cal. Rptr.
871, 877 (1983) (burden is upon original the parties to show compelling reasons for
continuing the sealing order).
79 Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1116 n.15.
80 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985).
81 Id. at 865.
[Vol. 66:117
NOTE - SEALED SETTLEMENTS
the substantive standard for sealing court records was clearly not
met at the time the order was entered. 2
Assuming, though, that the court properly granted the origi-
nal order, courts differ regarding the burden that a challenging
party must satisfy before the court will vacate or modify the exist-
ing order. Some courts, such as the Second and Sixth Circuits,
impose a heavy burden upon the intervening party and require a
showing of extraordinary circumstance or compelling need to
modify the order."3 Such a standard gives overwhelming weight
to the parties' reliance and virtually ignores the public right of ac-
cess. The rule, in effect, creates a presumption in favor of secrecy
over access.8
4
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has devel-
oped a more balanced approach that equitably accommodates the
competing interests. In Mokhiber v. Davis,' the court refused "to
adopt a per se rule that protective orders, once properly entered,
cannot be lifted absent 'extraordinary circumstance[s]' or 'compel-
ling need.'" 8 Rather, the court suggested that by invoking the
common law right of access, the intervening party establishes a
prima facie case that continued confidentiality is unjustified. The
opponents may then cite the properly entered order to satisfy
their burden of showing a countervailing interest that outweigh
the interest favoring public access. The intervening party then
must produce evidence showing why the opponents' interest in
secrecy is no longer sufficiently strong to outweigh the public
interest in disclosure. The practical effect of this approach is to
recognize the public's right of access, but also to give stability to
court orders by requiring the intervening party to produce suffi-
cient evidence to convince the court that the initial reasons for
secrecy are no longer present or are substantially weaker than
they originally were. In other words, the order has become an
anachronism. 7
82 Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1116 n.15 (D.C. 1988).
83 See Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 864; In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d
470, 478 (6th Cir. 1983); FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982);
Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979).
84 Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1116.
85 537 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1988).
86 Id. at 1116.
87 I at 1117; see also Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 149 Cal. App. 3d 308, 317, 196
Cal. Rptr. 871, 877 (1983) ("a sealing or confidentiality order in a dvil case is always
subject to continuing review and modification, if not termination, upon changed circum-
stances.").
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. The First Amendment Approach
A second argument frequently raised against sealing court
documents is a right of access based on the first amendment. The
Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized such a right, but
several state and lower federal courts have considered the issue.
Only the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and
one state court have found that a constitutional right to court
records exists."8 The Eleventh Circuit, while not explicitly recog-
nizing a constitutional right to court records, has nevertheless
fashioned a common law right protected by the constitutional
compelling interest standard. 9
Most of the courts explicitly recognizing a first amendment
right of access have reasoned by analogy from the Supreme
Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,"0 which
held that the public has a right under the first and fourteenth
amendments to attend criminal trials. In that case the defendant,
who was being tried for the fourth time.,91 requested that the
courtroom be cleared of all persons except the witnesses when
testifying. The prosecution did not object, and the trial judge
granted the motion." A newspaper and two of its reporters later
protested the closure, but their motion to vacate the order was
denied. 3 After the trial resulted in an acquittal, the newspaper
88 See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988)
(documents filed in connection with summary judgment motion); Publicker Indus., Inc. v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (hearing transcripts); In re Continental Ill. Sec.
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984) (special litigation committee report admitted into
evidence in connection with a motion to dismiss); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984) (all documents
filed in case); Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir.
1983) (pretrial documents in a criminal case); Hearst Corp. v. State, 60 Md. App. 651,
484 A.2d 292 (1984) (court records).
The District of Columbia Circuit distinguishes between pretrial/prejudgment access
and postjudgment access and has rejected both a first amendment and a common law
right of prejudgment access to court records. In doing so it has indirectly recognized
the possibility of a first amendment right of access after judgment. See In re Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("To the
extent a First Amendment right to postjudgment civil records exists, it does not ex-
ceed . .. the traditional common law right.").
89 See Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985).
90 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
91 The first trial had resulted in a conviction of second-degree murder, which was
reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court. The second and third trials had ended in
mistrials. Id. at 559.
92 Id. at 559-60.
93 Id. at 560-61.
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and the reporters intervened and petitioned the Virginia Supreme
Court for an appeal. The' petition was denied.94 The appellants
then sought review in the United States Supreme Court.
In reasoning toward the recognition of a first amendment
right to attend criminal trials, Chief Justice Burger, writing a plu-
rality opinion, began his analysis by tracing the evolution of the
criminal trial in the English and American legal systems and con-
cluded that historically criminal trials have been presumptively
open." He then examined the philosophical reasons for open
criminal trials. Openness discourages perjury, misconduct by the
participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality."
Chief Justice Burger emphasized the importance of open trials in
promoting confidence in the legal system and a public perception
that justice was being fairly administered. He noted the therapeu-
tic and prophylactic value of open trials in providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility, and emotion over criminal conduct
and for preventing vigilante enforcement of the criminal laws.97
Finally, he stressed the educative effect of public attendance at tri-
als in promoting a general understanding of the system and a
respect for the law."
The Chief Justice then proceeded to inquire into the basis
for a constitutional right to attend criminal trials and focused on
the 'first amendment, specifically the freedoms of speech and
press, and the rights of assembly and petition.99 He recognized
that the Constitution did not explicitly guarantee a right to attend
criminal trials but noted that "[t]he Bill of Rights was enacted
against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presump-
tively open."' Therefore, "[ijn guaranteeing freedoms such as
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as
protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give
meaning to those explicit guarantees."1 ' The Chief Justice cited
earlier Supreme Court cases recognizing a right to receive infor-
mation and ideas as implicit in the rights of free speech and
94 Id. at 562.
95 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 564-69 (1980).
96 I& at 569.
97 Id. at 571.
98 ld. at 572.
99 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
101 Id.
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press.102 "What this means in the context of trials is that the
First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily dosing courtroom doors
which had long been open to the public at the time that Amend-
ment was adopted."' The Chief Justice noted that the right of
assembly was also relevant because the drafters of the Constitu-
tion intended that right "to augment the free exercise of the oth-
er First Amendment rights.""°4
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court limited its holding to a
right to attend criminal trials, but it noted "that historically both
civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open."' 5 Jus-
tice Stewart, who concurred in the judgment, stated that he would
find a constitutional right of access to both civil and criminal
trials.' Given the historical concession by the Supreme Court,
the extension of Richmond Newspapers to the civil proceeding con-
text is easy to make,0 7 and several state and lower federal
courts have done so. 08
Openness plays a significant role in the function of civil, as
well as criminal, trials. It equally promotes true and accurate fact-
finding by discouraging perjury and encouraging witnesses to
come forward with new information. Public access to civil trials
also serves as a check upon the judicial process by exposing mis-
conduct, incompetence, and corruption. It fosters an appearance
of fairness and heightens public respect for the legal system.'0 9
102 Id. at 576 (citing First Nt'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 577.
105 Richmond Newpapers, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980).
106 Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring).
107 But see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 611 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Globe Newspaper held that mandatory closure of sex offense
trials involving victims under the age of eighteen violated the first amendment. In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor cautioned that she interpreted "neither Richmond
Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any implications outside the context
of criminal trials." Id.
108 See e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Publicker Indus., Inc. v Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059
(3d Cir. 1984); In ze Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cer. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983) (limiting its holding to
civil proceedings involving prison inmates); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); State v. Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc., 75 Md. App.
647, 542 A.2d 859 (1988).
109 Westmoreland, 752 F.2d at 23; Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1069-70; Brown & Williamson,
710 F.2d at 1179.
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In addition, civil trials frequently involve public concerns, such as
discrimination, products liability, bankruptcy and environmental
regulation. Thus, "community catharsis, which can only occur if
the public can watch and participate, is also necessary in civil cas-
es.""' In fact, the Supreme Court alluded to the advantages of
open civil trials in a footnote in the earlier case of Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale:
many of the advantages of public criminal trials are equally
applicable in the civil trial context. While the operation of the
judicial process in civil cases is often of interest only to the
parties in the litigation, this is not always the case. Thus, in
some civil cases the public interest in access, and the salutary
effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in
most criminal cases."1'
Some courts have further extended the Richmond Newspapers
holding to find a constitutional right of access to the judicial re-
cords of civil cases." 2 In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Federal Trade Commission,"' for example, the Sixth Circuit held
that the first amendment guaranteed a public right of access to
all documents filed in a civil case. The court reasoned that the
principles respecting public access to judicial proceedings apply
equally "as well to the determination of whether to permit access
to information contained in court documents because court re-
cords often provide important, sometimes the only, bases or ex-
planations for a court's decision.""4 Similarly, in Rushford v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc.,"' the Fourth Circuit held that the first
amendment protected access to documents filed in connection
with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.
These cases apply a broad interpretation of the Richmond
Newspapers holding and make little distinction between the right
of access to court proceedings and the right of access to court
records." 6 These courts understand Richmond Newspapers to rec-
110 Brown & Wifliamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
111 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.1 5 (1979) (citations omitted). But see In re Reporters Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (doubting that
the functions served by access to criminal trials are as important in the context of civil
trials).
112 See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984).
113 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
114 Id. at 1177.
115 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988).
'116 Cf. Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
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ognize the public's general right to receive information within a
court's control. The language of Chief Justice Burger's plurality
opinion allows for such an interpretation. In his opinion the
Chief Justice stated that the first amendment freedoms of speech
and press, standing alone, served as the basis for the public's right
to attend criminal trials.1 7 The people's right to assemble in a
public place was only subsequently mentioned as additional sup-
port for the Court's holding."8
The breadth of the court's two-prong analysis used to define
the scope of the right also permits application of the constitution-
al right of access in the judicial records context. " 9As a general
rule, court records have historically been open to the public, 20
and openness serves an important purpose in the functioning of
the court. Not only does it allow the public to check the abuse of
judicial authority, but it also educates the public about how the
courts are being used. Openness promotes confidence in the legal
system and a public perception that justice is being fairly adminis-
tered.' 2 '
Other courts, however, have taken a narrower view of Rich-
mond Newspapers-limiting its holding to a right to participate in
certain court proceedings and to receive information from those
proceedings. Such an interpretation has a significant impact upon
access to the records of settled cases because most of these cases
never culminate in a trial which the public would have a constitu-
tional right to attend. For example, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Schumacher,122 the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the
1983) (reversing the trial court's order to seal all documents in a widely publicized
criminal case when the court found "no reason to distinguish between pretrial proceed-
ings and the documents filed in regard to them").
117 Richmond Newpapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980). For the exact
text, see supm text at note 103.
118 See id. at 577-78.
119 One criticism of the historical analysis used by the Court is that it proves too
much. It elevates virtually every common law right to constitutional status because most
common law rights have withstood the test of time and function. Cf Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979) (critiquing application of the historical analy-
sis in a sixth amendment context).
120 See supra note 17. Some courts limit the common law presumption of openness
to certain categories of documents. See supra notes 21-37 and accompanying text. In
addition, some documents, such as discovery pleadings, are a fairly recent invention and
thus do not share the historical tradition of access. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d
1, 12 (1st Cir. 1986); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1111 (D.C. 1988).
121 In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th Cir. 1984); Crystal
Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980).
122 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986).
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two-prong analysis of Richmond Newspapers and refused to recog-
nize a constitutional right of access to settlement documents and
the transcripts of hearings approving the settlement and the distri-
bution of funds.'2" Schumacher involved several wrongful death
actions arising out of an airline crash. All the cases were settled
prior to trial, and pursuant to statute, separate hearings were held
to oversee the distribution of the settlement funds among the
•various heirs in each case and to approve the settlement figure in
one case involving a minor child.' 24 The hearings were held in
open court, but because no notice was given to the public or to
the media, only the litigants attended. 25 At the parties' request,
the settlement documents and the hearing transcripts were
sealed.126
Several news organizations sought access to the files. In de-
clining to apply a constitutional standard to the request for ac-
cess, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that historically most
cases have been settled in private, outside the courtroom and
without court involvement. 27 The court explained that the stat-
utes requiring the settlement agreements to be brought before
the court did not affect the historical analysis because the statutes
were enacted with the intent to facilitate the proper distribution
of settlement funds and to protect minors, and not for the pur-
pose of subjecting settlement agreements to public scrutiny.' 28
Philosophically, the court reasoned that access to, settlement docu-
ments would undermine the public policy favoring settlement of
disputed claims without litigation because one reason that litigants
settle is to avoid going to trial and publicly exposing their dis-
putes.'29 Schumacher denied a constitutional right of access to
documents filed with the court because those documents resulted
from a phase of litigation which the public did not have a consti-
123 The trial court originally sealed the entire case file, but later, after the Minnesota
Court of Appeals vacated the sealing order, the trial judge amended the order to in-
dude only the settlement documents and transcripts. It was this amended order that the
Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed. Rd at 201 n.3. The court stated that it did not
intend its decision to apply to other civil trial records or documents. Id. at 203.
124 See MINN. STAT. §§ 573.02, 540.08 (1984).
125 392 N.W.2d at 200.
126 See supra note 123.
127 Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Minn. 1986). The court supported its historical
conclusion with the fact that the rules of evidence precluded the admissibility of settle-
ment agreements, offers to settle, and statements made during settlement negotiations to
prove liability. I.
128 Id. at 205.
129 Id.
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tutional right to attend under the two-prong test of Richmond
Newspapers.
30
In Mokhiber v. Davis,'' the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia rejected the first amendment argument for ac-
cess to documents filed under seal in a civil case settled prior to
trial on the grounds that no court proceedings were conducted at
all. Only access to court records-pleadings and motions-was at
issue. 32 The court found wholly inapplicable the line of Su-
preme Court cases dealing with access to criminal proceed-
ings. 33 The court reasoned that the public interest in the pretri-
al disputes between private parties was significantly different from
the public interest in preliminary criminal proceedings where the
state ab initio is seeking to vindicate a wrong to society at
large.13 4 The court ultimately did hold that the common law
right of access attached to these pretrial documents.3 5
The Supreme Court itself seems to take this narrower inter-
pretation of Richmond Newspapers. Subsequent Supreme Court
cases applying the holding of Richmond Newspapers have been lim-
ited to other aspects of the criminal process and have never ad-
dressed access to records. 136 In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court (Press-Enterprise II),' Chief Justice Burger, this time writ-
ing a majority opinion for seven justices, restated the two-prong
inquiry of Richmond Newspapers to be "whether the place and pro-
cess have historically been open to the press and general public"
and "whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question."3 " Thus, the
constitutional right of access to information, as it currently stands,
is not as broad as the correlative freedom of expression,'3 9 and
130 Id. at 203.
131 537 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1988).
132 I- at 1107.
133 Id
134 Id. at 1108.
135 See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
136 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II)
(preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-
Enterprise I) (jury selection); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982) (rape trials involving a minor).
137 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
138 I& at 8 (emphasis added).
139 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 585 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may not be suppressed, the
First Amendment has not been viewed by the court in all settings as providing an
equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of access to information.")
[Vol. 66:117
NOTE - SEALED SETILEMENTS
does not really encompass all court records. At most, without
further guidance from the Supreme Court, it is a right which
attaches to civil court records only a public trial or hearing has
begun.1
40
II. LIMITING JUDICIAL DISCRETION: CLARIFYING THE COMMON
LAW APPROACH
Confusion about the nature of the public's right of access to
judicial records and about the proper weight to be given to the
various competing interests has bred much litigation over sealing
orders and some abuse of the procedure as well. The current
system affords the trial judge broad discretion in granting and
denying access and consequently results in inconsistent, unpredict-
able, and sometimes unfair outcomes, as in the Xerox case dis-
cussed at the beginning of this Note. Judges in this context are
often not detached decisionmakers. When a case reaches the set-
tlement stage, the judge has probably already become involved in
the case and may have even encouraged or assisted the parties to
settle. The judge most likely has preexisting attitudes and ideas
about the parties and their claims and cannot be depended upon
to adequately represent the public interests adversely affected by
sealing the record. 4'
Clearer standards for issuing sealing orders are needed to
limit judicial discretion while still protecting the public interest.
Clearer standards may even encourage the parties to settle their
dispute sooner. If the litigants know what information can be
filed under seal and what cannot, they may be more willing to
settle and to make larger concessions to avoid generating an ex-
tensive public record that they may not be able to seal later. 4 2
(citations omitted).
140 See Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh
Circuit reversed an order sealing the pleadings, docket entries, orders, filed affidavits
and deiositions, and transcripts of a civil case that went to trial but settled before the
jury rendered a verdict. The court applied a constitutional standard and noted that the
fact that the case actually went to trial was a significant factor in its decision. See also
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (granting access to tran-
scripts of a hearing which the court held that the public had a constitutional right to
attend).
141 Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and Beyond,
16 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 415, 417 n.16 (1981); see also In re Knoxville News-Sentinel
Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 475 (6th Cir. 1983) (district court should not be the sole guard-
ian of the first amendment).
142 Morrison, supra note 39, at 124. By way of example, Morrison mentions the
cases involving the Shiley heart valve, which the company settled before discovery started
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This would certainly deflate the argument that sealing orders are
necessary to promote settlement. 14
3
Reform, however, does not depend solely upon the recogni-
tion of an enforceable first amendment right of access. With its
constitutional underpinnings, the common law right to inspect
and copy judicial records is sufficiently strong and firmly estab-
lished by history and case law."' Even if a constitutional right
of access were to become generally acknowledged, courts would
most likely recognize only a qualified right of access, limited by
common law exceptions. 145 Rather, reform lies in providing
guidelines specifying the procedure courts should follow and the
weight judges should accord the competing public and private
interests in a decision to seal a case file in whole or in part.
A. State Reforms
A few states have recognized the need for reform and have
implemented procedural rules for sealing court records. In 1985,
the Georgia Supreme Court adopted Rule 21 of that state's Uni-
form Rules for the Superior Courts.146 The rule provides that
all court records are public and available for public inspection
unless a statute or an order entered pursuant to the procedures
established in the rule limit access. The prescribed procedures
permit a court to limit access to the court files of a civil action
only after a hearing on the matter. 147 Before limiting access the
trial court must make specific and adequate findings "that the
harm otherwise resulting to the privacy of a person in interest
clearly outweighs the public interest."14 These findings must be
stated in the sealing order. The order must also specify the part
by paying large sums of money. See also Comment, Common Law or First Amendment Right
of Access to Sealed Settlement Agreements, 54 J. AIR L & COMMERCE 577, 625 (1988).
143 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
144 But see Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1118 (D.C. 1988) (Ferren, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a first amendment right of access is
needed because a legislature or a court can amend or repeal the common law protec-
tion).
145 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984) (recognizing a constitutional right of access
to dvil court documents, but then limiting that right with common law exceptions); cf
Fenner & Koley, supra note 141, at 438-44 (suggesting that the limits on the public right
of access to criminal trials recognized in Richmond Newspapers will be the historical and
public policy limits already recognized by law).
146 Valenzeula v. Newsome, 253 Ga. 793, 801, 325 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1985).
147 GA. UNIF. R. SUPER. CTs. 21.1.
148 Id. Rule 21.2.
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of the file to which access is limited, as well as the nature and
duration of the limitation.14
9
In 1986, Massachusetts also adopted its own set of guidelines
for sealing court records in civil proceedings. The Massachusetts
Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure"O require that the
party request to seal documents by written motion, stating the
grounds and supporting reasons for the motion and describing
with particularity the material sought to be impounded and the
desired duration of impoundment.' 5 ' The moving party bears
the burden of showing good cause for the sealing order.' 52 As
under the Georgia rules, a hearing is required before a court may
seal the records,' but unlike Georgia, Massachusetts also re-
quires that notice be given to all parties and interested third per-
sons.1 4 Additionally, as in Georgia, the judge must make writ-
ten findings, and the sealing order must specify the material to
be impounded and the duration of the order. 5
B. Critique of the State Reforms
Both the Georgia and the Massachtisetts rules show an aware-
ness of the need not only to establish a procedure for sealing
court records, but also to specify the substantive standard to be
applied. On a procedural level, both states require a hearing and
specific written findings supporting the sealing order. Such proce-
dures protect the public's interest in access by preventing the trial
judge from automatically sealing court records upon stipulation by
the parties. The Massachusetts rule carries the protection one step
further by requiring that notice be given to third parties potential-
ly affected by the sealing order.
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Atlanta Journal v.
149 Id Rule 21.1.
150 Impoundment is defined as "the act of keeping some or all of the papers, doc-
uments, or exhibits, or portions thereof, in a case separate and unavailable for public
inspection" (i.e. sealing). MAss. UNIF. R. IMPOUNDMENT PROC. 1.
151 Id. Rule 2.
152 Id. Rule 7. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has subsequently
interpreted the good cause standard, an agreement of all the parties does not, in itself,
constitute good cause, but a legitimate expectation of privacy does. See H. S.- Gere &
Sons, Inc. v. Frey, 400 Mass. 326, 329 n.7, and 330, 509 N.E.2d 271, 273 n.7, and 274
(1987).
153 MASS. UNIF. R. IMPOUNDMENT PROC. 7. The rules allow a court to enter an ex
parte order of impoundment without a hearing, but a hearing must be held within ten
days. Id. Rule 3.
154 Id. Rule 4.
155 Id. Rule 8.
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Long,156 however, weakened the procedural protections that Rule
21 appears to offer. That case held that a trial court's failure to
satisfy the procedural requirement of adequate findings does not
constitute reversible error.17 The court found grounds to re-
verse the sealing order only after reweighing the balance of inter-
ests and concluding that the substantive standard of Rule 21 had
not been met, that is, that the harm to privacy interests did not
clearly outweigh the public interest in disclosure.158 Such an in-
terpretation defeats the purpose of Rule 21's procedural safe-
guards. It allows the trial court, without fear of reversal, to rou-
tinely seal court records without articulating its reasons. Instead, it
depends upon the appellate court to decide the substantive weight
of the competing interests. The Atlanta Journal holding also con-
tradicts the majority of courts that have found abuse of discretion.
when the trial court fails to state findings that justify sealing.'59
On a substantive level, both the Massachusetts and the Geor-
gia rules fall short of the discretion-limiting guidance that is need-
ed to adequately protect the public interest in access to court
records. The Massachusetts rules require merely a showing of
good cause in order to seal court records. 6 ' Good cause is the
standard usually required for the entry of a protective order seal-
ing discovery materials that are not part of the court record.' 6 1
Most courts, however, require a stronger showing in order to
permanently seal a case file.162 The Massachusetts rules make no
distinction between the showing required to impound discovery
materials and that necessary to permanently seal court records.
Thus, as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in H. S. Gere & Sons, Inc. v. Frey,163 good cause can be any
legitimate expectation of privacy held by a person who is not a
156 258 Ga. 410, 369 S.E.2d 755 (1988).
157 Id. at 413, 369 S.E.2d at 757.
158 Id. at 413-15, 369 S.E.2d at 757-60.
159 See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253-54 (4th Cir.
1988); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1176 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802-03 (lth Cir.
1983). But cf. In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313 (7th Cir. 1984)
(declining to remand order granting access despite lack of specific findings by the district
court).
160 MASS. UNIF. R. IMPOUNDMENT PROC. 7.
161 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).
162 See, e.g., In re Continental Ill. Sec. itig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1311 (7th Cir. 1984); Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). See also supra
notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
163 400 Mass. 326, 509 N.E.2d 271 (1987).
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public official.' Frey involved a civil suit arising out of the rape
of a child, naturally a matter of public interest and concern. The
case was settled prior to trial and the entire case file was im-
pounded. Noting the intensely personal nature of the information
contained in the record and the fact that the parties were not
public officials, the trial judge found good cause for impounding
the case file." 5 The appellate court affirmed, thus illustrating
how little protection the good cause standard affords the public
interest in access to court records.
The Georgia rules establish a slightly different type of stan-
dard. They create a balancing test that requires the trial judge to
find "that the harm otherwise resulting to the privacy of a person
in interest clearly outweighs the public interest" before limiting
access to court records. 66 Such a balancing test is typical of the
approach used by the majority of courts in deciding access ques-
tions.16
7
The philosophical ideal behind the balancing approach, a
product of legal realism, is that if the decisionmaker knows the
facts and policies involved in a particular case, then the correct
answer to legal disputes will follow. 16  Thus, the rules give the
judge a broad range of choices and permit policy decisions that
might be more appropriate for the legislature. The increased judi-
cial discretion, however, has not necessarily resulted in better
decisions.6 9 The problem is that when judges are given no
more guidance than a list of many interrelated and independent
factors to be weighed in a complex mix of competing consider-
ations, they face the dilemma of either trying to do the impossi-
ble and reason their way to a single correct result or to exercise
their own intuitive discretion. This predicament leads to inconsis-
tent outcomes.
170
The balancing approach presents an additional problem that
is particularly acute in questions of access to court records. As
one commentator noted, "even if a court could come up with
164 I& at 330, 509 N.E.2d at 274.
165 I& Another factor in the trial court's decision was that most of the documents
contained in the file were discovery documents. Nevertheless, the entire case file was
sealed.
166 GA. UNIF. R. SUPER. Cis. 21.2.
167 See supirn notes 44-75 and accompanying text.
168 Christie, An Fay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE LJ. 747, 764.
169 Id. at 765.
170 Henderson, Why Creative Judging Won't Save the Products Liability System, 11
HoFSrA L REv. 845, 848 (1983).
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relatively concise and yet meaningful statements of the interests
involved in a particular case, one would face the further problem
of deciding whether the interests identified were really compara-
ble enough to permit balancing them against each other."17' In
sealing decisions, the public interest in disclosure is pitted directly
against individual privacy interests, and trial judges have received
little guidance from either the legislatures or the appellate courts
on how to balance these two distinct categories of interests. Trial
judges would best be guided by a legislative determination of the
weight to be accorded the public right of access. The legislature is
the appropriate body to make this public policy evaluation, as it is
more representative of and accountable for the public interest.
C. A Proposal
Although the Massachusetts and Georgia rules are a step in
the right direction, they could be improved by further clarification
of the substantive standards that govern sealing decisions. Legisla-
tors should attempt to codify the common law right to inspect
judicial records, along with its exceptions, as Congress has done
for the federal bankruptcy courts.172 A model statute might be
drafted as follows:
(1) All documents filed with the court are public records and
available for inspection unless access is limited by statute or by
court order entered according to the procedures set forth
below.
(2) Upon the entry of a final judgment or consent decree, any
party to a civil action may move to seal specific documents or
portions thereof contained in the court records.
(3) Before limiting access to court records, the court shall
give notice to all parties and interested third parties and shall
hold a hearing on the motion. The court shall not seal court
171 Christie, supra note 168, at 766.
172 See 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1988):
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a paper filed in a
case under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records
and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge.
(b) On request of a party in interest, the bankruptcy court shall, and on
the bankruptcy court's own motion, the bankruptcy court may-
(1) protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential
research, development, or commercial information; or
(2) protect a person with respect to scandalous or defamatory
matter contained in a paper filed in a case under this title.
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records except upon finding that the moving party has proved
by clear and convincing evidence that information contained in
the document sought to be sealed:
(a) constitutes a trade secret or other confidential com-
mercial research or information;
(b) is a matter of national security;
(c) promotes scandal or defamation;
(d) pertains to wholly private family matters, such as di-
vorce, child custody, or adoption;
(e) poses a serious threat of harassment, exploitation,
physical intrusion, or other particularized harm to the
parties to the action; or
(f) poses the potential for harm to third persons not
parties to the litigation.
(4) The sealing order shall specify the documents to be
sealed, the reasons for sealing, and the duration of the order.
This model is designed merely to address the specific prob-
lem that is the subject of this Note, namely the permanent sealing
of the case files of civil actions settled out of court. Other provi-
sions setting forth the standards governing criminal records and
the sealing of civil records prior to trial would have to be includ-
ed because these situations involve additional considerations, such
as preserving the integrity of the trial process. This statute would
not preempt other statutes establishing procedures for access to
specific types of documents."7 3
Procedurally, the model. is very similar to the Georgia and
Massachusetts rules. It provides for a hearing and notice to third
parties, thus preventing the trial judge from simply rubber-stamp-
ing an agreement among the parties. Substantively, though, the
model more clearly defines the relation between the competing
public and private interests, which are not easily compared in a
balancing test, and thus limits, without abolishing, the range of
judicial discretion. The clear and convincing burden of persuasion
establishes the strength of the presumption in favor of openness.
The statute specifies six instances in which individual privacy
interests may become more important than the public interest in
access. The first three are well recognized exceptions to the com-
173 See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (holding
that the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records did not authorize the
release of tape recordings played for the jury because the Presidential Recordings Act
provided an alternative means of access).
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mon law right.174 The fourth protects privacy when the public
has little interest in the controversy and is supported by the con-
stitutional right to privacy that the Supreme Court has recognized
in certain family matters. 75 The fifth exception allows the court
to seal certain settlement agreements, particularly portions disclos-
ing a large settlement amount, which might expose the parties to
theft, exploitation or other physical intrusion.1 76 The threat of
harm, however, must be more than mere speculation and does
not necessarily mandate sealing the entire case file. 7 7 Finally,
the last exception protects third parties who have involuntarily be-
come subjects of public scrutiny through court records, such as
bank records filed as part of a civil action. The requisite showing
of harm is less than that required under subsection (e) because
these third persons have not purposely availed themselves of the
court processes.
III. CHALLENGING COURT ENDORSED STIPULATIONS OF SILENCE
When litigants settle a case and stipulate to sealing the court
records, they usually also agree to a court order, commonly called
a "gag order," restraining the parties, their counsel, and possibly
others involved in the case from discussing the case with mem-
bers of the media or the general public. The first amendment
implications of a permanent restraint on communication are
readily apparent; nevertheless, few such orders entered pursuant
to a settlement agreement have ever been challenged. The parties
have little motivation to challenge the court's order because they
stipulated to it, and third parties face procedural difficulties in
seeking review of the order.
174 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, -410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
176 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn.
1986) (heirs of airline crash victims were subject to harassment and physical intrusion);
see also In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 785, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (1977)
(suggesting that threats of terrorist attacks might be sufficient justification for temporarily
sealing court records).
177 In Schumacher, the litigants produced evidence of physical intrusion in their lives
that had already occurred. 392 N.W.2d at 206. Only the settlement agreements and
transcripts of the settlement hearings were sealed. Id. at 201 n.3.
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A. The First Amendment Challenge
1. Challenges by Third Parties
The federal circuit courts of appeal are currently split on the
ability of third parties to challenge gag orders.' All the circuits
agree that third parties have standing to seek review,' but dif-
fer on the rights that a third party may assert. The Second and
the Ninth Circuits have held that a difference exists between the
first amendment rights that the gagged party may raise to
challenge the order and the first amendment rights that a third
party may assert. The gagged party may challenge the order as a
prior restraint on the freedom of speech,' which bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity.'' However, in In re Application of Dow
Jones & Co., Inc."8 2 and Radio & Television News Association of
Southern California v. United States District Court,' the Second
and Ninth Circuits respectively held that third parties could not
assert the first amendment rights of the parties directly restrained
by the order.'84 A gag order, when challenged solely by a third
party, was held to be less intrusive of first amendment rights and
to not amount to a prior restraint. 8 5 In the case of a third-par-
178 Compare In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988) and Rdio & Television News Ass'n of Southern Cal. v.
United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) with CBS Inc. v. Young, 522
F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1985).
179 In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records,
864 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989); Application of DowJones, 842 F.2d at 607; Radio &
Television News, 781 F.2d at 1446; CBS Inc., 522 F.2d at 237-38. The basis for standing is
the right to receive information and ideas where there is a willing speaker. Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
Willingness to speak on the part of the restrained parties may be inferred from the
entry of the gag order itself. If the parties were unwilling to speak, a gag order would
be unnecessary. The parties' stipulation to the order does not mean that they are unwill-
ing to speak. See Application of Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 607-08.
180 See, e.g., Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). See also infra note 191 and accompanying text.
181 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
182 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
183 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986).
184 842 F.2d at 609; 781 F.2d at 1448. Both of these cases involved news agencies
challenging gag orders restraining the trial participants from communicating with the
media.
185 842 F.2d at 609; 781 F.2d at 1447.
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ty challenge, a gag order need only be justifiable1 6 or reason-
able,117 meaning that the order will stand if supported by ade-
quate factual findings 8 of state interests that override the
order's very limited effects on first amendment rights.18 9
The Sixth Gircuit, on the other hand, has taken the opposite
view in holding that third parties may challenge a gag order as a
prior restraint. 90 Whether challenged by a third party or by the
restrained parties themselves, a court order classified as a prior
restraint on the freedom of speech is subject to strict scrutiny. It
will be upheld only if the government satisfies a three-prong test:
(1) the speech or activity restrained poses a clear and present
danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected compet-
ing interest; (2) the order is narrowly drawn; and (3) less restric-
tive alternatives are not available.'9
Most cases challenging gag orders as prior restraints concern
orders restraining extrajudicial statements made before or during
trial. The competing interest sought to be protected is the right
to a fair trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment for criminal
trials and by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments in the context of civil trials.19 2 However, when a
gag order is entered pursuant to a settlement agreement, the
right to a fair trial is not implicated at all, and other possible
competing interests must be evaluated.
Numerous other important interests could be argued, includ-
ing many of the same interests that might justify a sealing order
at common law, such as protecting privacy rights or preventing
the dissemination of defamatory material, but courts have held
that these interests alone do not override the more significant first
186 842 F.2d at 609.
187 781 F.2d at 1447.
188 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Rothwax, 143 A.D.2d 592, 533 N.Y.S.2d 73
(1988) (gag order vacated for lack of adequate factual findings).
189 Radio & Television News Ass'n of S. Cal. v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d
1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Cummings v. Beaton & Assocs., Inc., 192 Ill. App.
3d 792, 798 n.2, 549 N.E.2d 634, 638 n.2 (1989) (noting in dicta the possibility of
situations in which the privacy interests of litigants may be served by an order restricting
the dissemination of information, such as trade secrets or other confidential informa-
tion).
190 See CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
191 E.g., Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985), cen.
denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
192 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (criminal trial); Levine v.
United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158
(1986) (criminal trial); CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (civil trial);
Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d 223, 492 N.E.2d 1327 (1986) (civil trial).
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amendment interests in freedom of expression.1 9 3 'Only when a
valid sealing order has actually been entered does it seem possible
for a post-settlement gag order to withstand the strict scrutiny of
a prior restraint analysis. In this context, a gag order may be
deemed necessary to give effect to the court's sealing order. With-
out a sealing order, a gag order would serve no useful purpose
because the information sought to be kept secret would be part
of the public record. 94
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,1 95 the Supreme Court held
that a protective order restricting dissemination of information ac:
quired through the trial court's discovery processes did not violate
the litigants' first amendment rights. The Court noted "that an
order prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before
trial is not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting
First Amendment scrutiny."196 "A litigant has no First Amend-
ment right of access to information made available only for pur-
poses of trying his suit."9 ' Because access to the information
was obtained solely by virtue of court processes, the Court con-
cluded that "continued court control over the discovered informa-
tion [did] not raise the same specter of government censorship
that such control might suggest in other situations."19 8
The Court based part of its decision on the fact that the
information was obtained through discovery, a non-public compo-
nent of a civil trial, and concluded that the restraints were not
restrictions on a traditionally public source of information. A
rough analogy can be made to a restraining order issued in con-
junction with an order sealing a court record, a traditionally pub-
lic source of information. In Seattle Times, the Court recognized
that "to the extent that courthouse records could serve as a
source of public information," the trial court had discretion to
193 See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1350 (1st Cir. 1986) (in-
fringement on privacy rights or potential for embarrassment are insufficient bases for a
prior restraint); Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1963) (court lacked
authority to enjoin possible defamatory statements); Reiter v. Mason, 563 So.2d 749 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Lee, 353 N.W.2d 213 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (protection of child in juvenile dependency case did not rise to the
level required to justify a prior restraint).
194 Oklahoma Publishing Corp. v. Oklahoma County Dist Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977); Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Reiter v. Mason, 563 So. 2d 749
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
195 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
196 Id. at 33.
197 Id. at 32 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 6-17 (1965)).
198 Id.
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control access to that source.'99 Thus, if a court has found ade-
quate justification for sealing certain records, it should be able to
enjoin dissemination of the information that the litigants may
have obtained from those records in order to give effect to the
sealing order.2" The difference in the analogy between restrict-
ing access to traditionally private information obtained through
the court's discovery process and restricting access to court re-
cords, traditionally public sources of information, is reflected in
the higher standard required to seal court records, 20 1 as op-
posed to the "good cause" needed to issue a protective order
over discovered material.0 2
It must be noted, however, that a crucial consideration for
the Court's holding that the protective order in Seattle Times did
not offend the first amendment was the fact that the protective
order prevented the parties from disseminating only information
obtained through the discovery process. The order did not restrict
disclosure of identical information if that information was ac-
quired from independent sources.203 The Court has recently re-
emphasized this point in Butterworth v. Smith.0 4 In that case the
Court struck down a Florida statute which prohibited a grand jury
witness from ever disclosing the content of his testimony even
after the term of the grand jury had ended. In the Court's view
neither the state's interests in preserving grand jury secrecy dur-
ing the term nor in protecting the reputation of exonerated indi-
viduals warranted a permanent ban on disclosure of witness tes-
timony.2°- The Court distinguished Seattle Times on the ground
that Butterworth involved only the witness's right to divulge infor-
mation that he had before he testified, as opposed to information
that he obtained as a result of his participation in the grand jury
proceedings. 20 6 The Court also noted the dramatic impact of
the restraint: before testifying a witness possesses information on
199 Id. at 33 n.19.
200 Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 297 Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983) (sealing
order could be "rendered ineffective if matters restricted by [the order] were revealed by
persons privy to the information.").
201 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
202 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
203 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34, 37 (1984).
204 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990).
205 Id at 1381-82.
206 Id. at 1381; see also In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to
Custodian of Records, 864 F.2d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir. 1989) ("If [the] order prevents
disclosure of documents prepared and assembled independent of the grand jury proceed-
ings, . . . it would be too broad.").
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a matter of public concern and is free to speak at wil, but after
testifying the witness is no longer free to communicate this infor-
mation.2
0 7
Such an observation is a relatively accurate description of the
effect of stipulated gag orders. Prior to their involvement in a
lawsuit, the potential parties, particularly the plaintiffs, are free to
discuss their claims and injuries with interested third parties. But
once the case is settled and a stipulated gag order is entered, a
wall of silence supported by the threat of contempt is erected
surrounding the transactions and events that gave rise to the law-
suit. The court order thus frustrates the efforts of government
officials and the private sector to find solutions to contemporary
social problems and prevents other potential plaintiffs similarly
situated from educating themselves about their situation, perhaps
to their detriment. Because these third parties have limited first
amendment interests with which- to challenge such orders, the
responsibility for giving consideration to these interests falls upon
the parties, their counsel,208 and the court.
The court, in particular, should not be persuaded by the
parties .to abuse its powers and rubberstamp a stipulated covenant
of silence "with penalty of contempt" simply because'such an
order is not likely to be challenged. 2 9 Arguably, the court does
not have the power to issue such a broad order. A gag order
issued in this context should be limited to information obtained
through the discovery process or from documents properly sealed.
The order should not restrict dissemination of information which
the parties acquired prior to the litigation or from independent
sources. Although under a narrower order a party is still free not
to speak, it is that freedom to choose to speak or to not speak
that the first amendment protects against infringement by the
court.
2. Challenges by the Parties Restrained: The Problem of Waiver
If a party, despite having agreed to the entry of a gag order,
later wishes to challenge the validity of the order, that party could
theoretically argue that the order is a prior restraint on speech as
207 110 S. Ct. at 13,83.
208 See infra part IV, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
209 See United States v. Petro-Processors of Louisiana, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.
La. 1982) (court vacated its order approving stipulated confidentiality when parties made
public statements that the court bad ordered them to keep the information contained in
certain environmental reports confidential).
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discussed in the previous section.210 In such a case, nonetheless,
the effect of the stipulation must be considered. The issue be-
comes whether the parties, by agreeing to entry of the order,
have waived their first amendment rights to challenge the order.
The waiver doctrine does not mean that the court must automati-
cally issue an order corresponding to the parties' agreement, but
only that the parties should be estopped from later asserting their
right to disseminate the protected information. The court must
still undertake the proper evaluation in its decision to issue the
order.211
Nevertheless, at least one court has held that a party may
challenge an invalid gag order at any time even despite a prior
stipulation. In Crosby v. Bradstreet Co.,2 12 a libel action was settled
on the stipulation that the defendant, a credit rating bureau,
would refrain from publishing any report or statement about the
plaintiff or his business. The trial court entered an order pursu-
ant to that stipulation. Thirty-nine years later, the plaintiff, realiz-
ing the business advantage of having a credit rating from the
defendant (now Dun & Bradstreet), sought to have the order
terminated. The Second Circuit held that the trial court was with-
out power to make such an order as it constituted a prior re-
straint against publication of facts which the community had a
right to know. The fact that the parties agreed to the order was
considered immaterial.
213
B. The Public Policy Challenge
Finally, at least one court has invalidated a stipulated gag
order on public policy grounds without consideration of the first
amendment interests. In Mary 1R v. B. & R. Corp.,214 a Califor-
nia court held that a trial court's stipulated gag order was against
public policy. A civil lawsuit alleging that a licensed physician had
sexually molested a fourteen-year-old female patient had been set-
tled, and, pursuant to stipulation by the parties, the trial court
had issued an order sealing the court records and enjoining the
parties, their agents or representatives from ever discussing the
underlying facts of the case with anyone. A family counselor
210 See supra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
211 The concept of waiver has been urged in the context of subsequent challenges to
stipulated protective orders. See Marcus, supra note 43, at 68-73.
212 312 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1963).
213 Id. at 485.
214 149 Cal. App. 3d 308, 196 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1983).
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learned of the allegations and filed a complaint with the Division
of Medical Quality of the State Board of Medical Quality Assur-
ance (Division). The Division attempted to investigate, but the
court order frustrated its efforts. The girl stated that she would
willingly supply the Division with information if she were not pro-
hibited from doing so by the court order. The Division then
sought modification of the court order, but the trial court denied
the request because the physician would not consent.
The appellate court reversed the order of confidentiality be-
cause it effectively blocked the Division from fulfilling its statutory
obligation to investigate all complaints of physician miscon-
duct-"thus giving a judicial stamp of approval to a ploy obviously
designed by the physician to aid him to avoid professional regula-
tion. "215 The court noted that a law designed for the public wel-
fare could not be' circumvented by private stipulation. Such an
agreement violated public policy and was unenforceable, and it
was improper for a court to sanction such a stipulation with a
court order.21 6
The holding in Mary . is significant for its potential applica-
tion to other regulatory areas of public interest. For example, in
the environmental area, courts might refuse to approve stipula-
tions that prevent toxic tort plaintiffs from discussing their illness-
es with local and federal health officials trying to study the long-
term effects of exposure to toxic chemicals. In the securities area,
courts might not enforce agreements among the parties to not
disclose insider trading information to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. I7
Even though a court may not have the power to grant a com-
prehensive gag order, the parties are not left without a remedy
for unlawful disclosure of private information by other parties. A
party can still bring an action for defamation or invasion of priva-
cy or for product disparagement. Such legal remedies have a less
chilling effect on speech than a court order, the violation of
which results in punishment for contempt.
2 11
215 I& at 316, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
216 IR at 317, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
217 Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 955,
1028 (1988) (suggesting potential applications of Mary I,. in the securities and antitrust
areas).
218 In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Near v.
Minnesota ex teL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931)).
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IV. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The law concerning sealing entire case files and restraining
litigants from discussing the facts of their case with third parties
is still very unsettled. Until the standards for entering such orders
are defined more precisely, almost anything goes. Under current
law, a good faith argument certainly exists for sealing the entire
record and ordering the parties to keep silent. The fact that the
law permits these procedural devices, however, does not mean
that the lawyers and their clients who use them are without re-
proach.
Some would argue that a lawyer's duty is to serve the client's
best interests within the bounds of the law.219 If agreeing to seal
the case file will result in a higher settlement for the client, then
the lawyer should urge the client to agree.220 The lawyer has no
ethical obligation to consider the interests of third parties whom
the lawyer does not represent. The lawyer is supposed to be mor-
ally neutral and nonaccountable for the client's actions and deci-
221sions.
This reasoning reflects the adversarial ethic which has domi-
nated American legal ethics for some time. Although still believed
necessary in criminal defense to protect against overzealous in-
fringement of individual liberties by the state, the application of
the adversarial ethic to civil litigation and nonadversarial situations
has come under attack in recent years.222 As the practice of law
increasingly involves issues affecting the public interest, the ques-
tion that arises is whether the lawyer is a morally autonomous
professional or simply a technical expert-a hired gun. On the
one hand, lawyers are still generally perceived as professionals, as
219 This argument has its origins in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 7 (1981) [hereinafter the MODEL CODE] which advocates that "[a] lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct which succeeded the Model Code, replaced the standard of zealousness
with one of reasonable diligence, which does not bind the lawyer "to press for every
advantage that might be realized for a client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.3 & comment (1) (1987) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
220 Under MODEL RULES, supra note 219, Rule 1.2(a), and MODEL CODE, supra note
219, EC 7-7, the Model Code, the decision whether to accept a settlement offer rests
with the client.
221 See generally Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 307,
372-89 (1988).
222 See, e.g., Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Piorities Regarling Confidentiality, 41
WASH. & LEE L REv. 421 (1984); Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Law-
yers, 66 CALIF. L REV. 669 (1978).
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are doctors, architects, and teachers. Part of what distinguishes a
professional from the average business person, at least in the
public's mind, is an expected commitment to the social good. On
the other hand, lawyers are not supposed to impose their person-
al morality on the client.
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct reflect this tension.22 For example, Rule 4.4 requires
the lawyer to respect the rights of third persons, but the lawyer is
supposed to defer to the client, regarding concern for third per-
sons who might be adversely affected.224 The Model Rules also
provide that in rendering advice, the lawyer may refer not only to
the law but also to other relevant moral, economic, social, and
political considerations.225 However, nothing in the Model Rules
obligates the client to heed the lawyer's nonlegal advice, or holds
the lawyer responsible for the client's morally objectionable deci-
sions.22 6 The Model Rules permit a lawyer to withdraw from
representing a client if the "client insists upon pursuing an objec-
tive that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent, [or if with-
drawal can be] accomplished without material adverse effect on
the interests of the client."227 For a lawyer settling a case condi-
tioned upon stipulated sealing and gag orders, this provision of-
fers a minimal outlet. It is doubtful whether a sealing order rises
to the level of a repugnant or imprudent objective, and withdriw-
al from a case at the point of settlement would likely have a ma-
terially adverse effect on the client's interests.
Overall, withdrawal is not an adequate remedy, for there will
always be some lawyer who will do what the client wants. A more
effective solution lies in redefining the lawyer-client relationship.
One suggestion is to create and protect a sphere of moral autono-
my in which lawyers would "align themselves more with the
courts and their peers and less with their clients."228 This re-
223 Cf. Penegar, supra note 221 (discussing how the Model Code contains many
internal contradictions which reflect two distinct views of the legal profession: the domi-
nant view of a highly individualistic, adversarial system versus the lesser tradition of the
more cooperative, communal society seeking to avoid conflict and struggle).
224 MODEL RULES, supra note 219, Rule 1.2 comment.
225 MODEL RULES, supra note 219, Rule 2.1; cf. MODEL CODE, supm note 219, EC 7-
8.
226 Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 219, EC 7-8 ("In the final analysis, however, the
lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available
objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for
himself.").
227 MODEL RULES, supra note 220, Rule 1.16 (b)(3).
228 Elliston, Ethic; Professionalism and the Practice of Law, 16 LoY. U. CHI. L J. 529,
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alignment would place limits on the client's use of lawyers to
achieve immoral ends. 29 Another more immediate solution is
for lawyers and clients to engage in a dialogue regarding their
joint responsibility for certain community-shared values, such as
fairness to others, especially in cases of public interest.230 In a
case such as the one discussed at the beginning of this Note,
where a defendant client insists upon sealing the entire record,
perhaps a compromise could be reached in which the plaintiffs
would be allowed to discuss their illnesses with public health offi-
cials.
V. CONCLUSION
The process of settling cases without trial has traditionally
been a private matter among the parties. However, to the extent
that parties take advantage of court processes to resolve their
dispute, the case should not be shielded from public scrutiny.
Documents that are filed with the court to advance litigation
should be open for public inspection, with limited exceptions. If
the parties opt to receive the benefit of being able to enforce
their settlement agreement with the court's comtempt power, the
public is entitled to know the ends for which the court's power is
being used. Openness is an important feature of the American
judicial system. Not only does it serve to check the exercise of
judicial authority and to provide an understanding of how the
legal system operates, but more importantly it fosters an appear-
ance of fairness and promotes confidence in the system. When
cases presented for resolution in the public forum are surrounded
with secrecy, there is a natural tendency to question whether jus-
tice is being equitably administered. The public and private inter-
ests in settling cases without litigation should not be allowed to
compromise the importance of a generally open judicial system.
Changes are needed to halt the increasingly common practice
of sealing the court records of settled cases and enforcing cove-
nants of silence. Reform must occur in the law so that judges and
litigants receive clearer guidance about the procedures and stan-
dards that govern the sealing of court records. Courts should
limit their enforcement of covenants of silence to orders that are
necessary to give effect to sealing orders. Responsibility for
546 (1985).
229 Id.
230 Penegar, supra note 221, at 382-85.
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change also rests with lawyers and their clients. They should dis-
cuss the ethical implications of confidentiality agreements and ex-
plore compromise solutions which will diminish the adverse effect
of such agreements on third parties.
Anne-T,rkse Bichamps

